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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1935 President Franklin Roosevelt signed the Social Security Act. This act 
introduced a broad social insurance program in the United States, which followed the 
introduction of similar programs in Europe (Germany in 1883, Great Britain in 1911). 
The official name of Social Security is the Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability 
Insurance (OASDI) program. The name refers to the main three components of Social 
Security, but there are other welfare and insurance programs within Social Security.  
The program has been successful as the living standards of the elderly improved 
considerably since its creation. The poverty rate among people aged 65 and older dropped 
from roughly 50% in the 1930s to less than 10% in the 2000s. Currently the poverty rate 
among senior citizens is less than the poverty rate among working adults. The elderly are 
no longer dependent on their children; they own their housing, and retirement years have 
become “a period of enjoyment and creative experience and a reward for a lifetime of 
labor” (Costa 1998, 27). One third of all beneficiaries receive at least 90% of their 
income and two-thirds receive at least half of their income from Social Security (Costa 
1998). 
There are many issues for discussion regarding Social Security‟s effects on the 
economic activity of the population and the economic performance of the country in 
general. Economists have been studying how Social Security affects the labor supply 
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decision, savings, economic growth, fiscal policy, and so forth. The objective of this 
dissertation is to study some of the equity issues associated with Social Security.  
There are two main types of inequality within Social Security: intragenerational 
and intergenerational inequalities. Regarding intragenerational inequality, we examine 
how black workers fare relative to white workers within the same age cohort. We do it by 
estimating the effective net tax rate for these two racial groups. Shorter life expectancy of 
black workers means that their life in retirement is shorter; therefore they draw less in 
social security retirement benefits than white workers in the same age and income group, 
which in turn means that they face a higher effective Social Security tax rate. There are 
several reasons for this exercise. First, the differences in net tax rates may differentially 
affect labor force participation or the distribution of labor among families of different 
racial and age groups. Second, the progressivity of the benefit schedule may be 
eliminated when differential mortality is accounted for across different income groups 
among black workers. Third, Social Security may contribute to the wealth gap among 
racial groups.  
Regarding intergenerational inequality, we are convinced that people are not 
treated the same over time. The normal retirement age has been 65 for many years. 
Although according to 1983 amendments the retirement age is set to increase to 67 by 
2027, it is not growing at the same rate as life expectancy. The main components of the 
program have been unchanged for decades. This means that future generations will be 
drawing benefits for longer periods than earlier generations while they contribute to the 
program roughly for the same period of time. Our aim is to show that imposing a simple 
intergenerational fairness principle may secure long term financial stability of the Social 
3 
 
Security program. We also demonstrate that if this kind of policy were adopted early in 
the past, then the amendments of 1983 aimed at restoring the long term fiscal soundness 
would not have been necessary. 
All incidents of inequity in our study stem from disparities in life expectancy 
across demographic groups. Black workers have always had higher mortality rates than 
their white counterparts. According to the literature this gap narrowed in the first half of 
the 20
th
 century, but it was stable in the second half of the last century. Levine et al. 
(2001) show that if one uses data from 1933 until 1999 to project future white-black 
mortality and life expectancy ratios, then the gap tends to close. But if one observes only 
the 1954-1999 period, then extrapolation of these ratios shows that the gap is stable until 
2063. However, studies that incorporate data from the 2000s show the black-white life 
expectancy disparity closed a little, but experts do not expect the gap to be eliminated in 
the foreseeable future (Harper et al. 2007). At the same time, life expectancy has grown 
steadily for all race and sex groups over time, and growth is expected to continue, which 
produces inequality in the services of Social Security across generations.  
The Social Security program has grown into a huge program. In 2008 51 million 
people received benefits of $615.3 billion (21% of federal spending), and 162 million 
people paid payroll taxes totaling $672 billion (25% of federal receipts). Because Social 
Security pays so many benefits to so many people, politicians are very cautious about 
tampering with it. Nevertheless, the reform of the Social Security program has propelled 
discussion among politicians and scholars over the last decade because the Social 
Security program is projected to become financially unsustainable in the future (2009 
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Annual Report of the Social Security Board of Trustees; 2004 Long Term Analysis of the 
Congressional Budget Office).  
The reasons behind the long term deficit of Social Security are both demographic 
and economic. Fertility and mortality rates have declined steadily in the United States; 
this pattern is common among many developed countries in the world. The downward 
trend in fertility has been observed since the beginning of the 20
th
 century. There was 
only one period of sharp increase in birth rates in the United States, and this occurred 
after World War II and lasted for about 20 years. That period is known as “the baby 
boom.” Seventy six million babies were born during this period; the fertility rate reached 
3.77 in 1957 compared to 2.1 in 1930. The reasons for the baby boom are clear. There 
was great optimism after World War II, families were moving to the suburbs, and 
incomes were rising rapidly, not the least because the United States came out of World 
War II as the main producer of most manufactured goods. Baby-boomers became the 
largest generation in American history. This generation had a substantial impact on 
American economic history. In the 1950s, baby boomers brought rapid growth in demand 
for housing and expenditures on schools. In the 1960s, this generation brought more 
spending on higher education. In the 1970s, they produced growth in the labor force 
(Weaver 1982). From now and into the future, baby boomers will put considerable 
pressure on Social Security‟s budget as they move into retirement.  
Another characteristic demographic trend is the decline in mortality rates. In 1935 
when Social Security was established the overall life expectancy was 61 years. More than 
half of Americans would not live to 65 to collect their Social Security benefits. In 2009, 
the life expectancy for males is more than 75 years, while that of females is above 80 
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years. Data on life expectancy at retirement are shown in Figures 1.1 and 1.2 for men and 
women respectively. Numbers beyond 2009 are projected by the Board of Trustees and 
presented under three different future cost scenarios (intermediate, low, high). Different 
cost scenarios correspond to different assumptions underlying the projection procedures 
(fertility, immigration, long-term productivity growth, unemployment, and so forth) with 
intermediate being the best-guess scenario. In 1935 newly retired men could expect to 
receive benefits for 12 years on average, while retired women could expect to receive 
benefits for 13 years. Currently we expect men to receive benefits for 17 years and 
women to receive them for 19 years on average. Benefits paid have gone up by more than 
40% since 1935. From this source of social security alone, the cost of old age insurance 
has increased by 40% per retiree since 1940.  
 
 
Figure 1.1: Life Expectancy of the Male Population at Age 65 
 
Notes: Based on the 2009 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees. Before 2009 the 
Intermediate scenario represents historical data. 
6 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Life Expectancy of the Female Population at Age 65 
 
Notes: Based on the 2009 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees.  Before 2009 the 
Intermediate scenario represents historical data. 
 
Since Social Security is a pay-as-you-go system, these demographic tendencies 
lead to a decline in the number of taxpaying workers per Social Security beneficiary. In 
1950, 16 working people paid benefits for a single retired person. In 1960, only five 
workers were paying benefits of a retired worker. By 2010, this number dropped below 
three. In 2030, the number of workers supporting benefits of a retiree is projected to be 
two, and this ratio is expected beyond 2030 if current demographic trends continue 
(Gramlich 2003, 28).  
Theoretically it is possible that productivity growth will be high enough so that 
affordable benefits can continue without raising the payroll taxes of workers. But the data 
show that since World War II productivity has been declining. Right after the war 
productivity and real wages grew rapidly for a number of reasons. First, the United States 
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came out of the war with its industrial base unharmed, while other industrial countries 
were suffering from the war‟s destructions. Second, natural resources were relatively 
cheap. As a result, real wage growth rate was on average 2% until the 1970s. In the 
1970s, the United States started to experience productivity slowdown as the above factors 
reversed. Real annual wage growth dropped to 1% and has remained at this level since 
then. There is nothing to suggest that productivity growth rate will change significantly in 
the near future.  
Since the conception of Social Security in 1935, in most fiscal years contributions 
into the program exceeded the expenditures from it. These surpluses accumulated in the 
Social Security Trust Fund. This trust fund is invested in special government bonds, and 
it earns interest on these bonds. According to the 2009 Annual Report of the Board of 
Trustees, the annual surplus will continue until 2017 under the “intermediate cost” 
scenario.  
Figure 1.3 shows the projected surplus/deficit in the annual budget until 2018 and 
Figure 1.4 shows the projected size of the Social Security Trust Fund until 2080 under 
three different cost scenarios (intermediate, low, and high). According to the Board of 
Trustee‟s projections the Trust Fund will be exhausted by 2035 under the “best-guess” 
scenario.  
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Figure 1.3: Projected Social Security Budget 
 
Notes: Based on the 2009 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.4: Projected Social Security Trust Fund (Billions of Dollars) 
 
Notes: Based on the 2009 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees. 
 
9 
 
This dissertation contains two essays.  In the first essay, we calculate the net 
marginal Social Security tax rate for different racial and income groups. The net marginal 
Social Security tax rate (NMSSTR) is the difference between the Social Security tax rate 
and the present value of future benefits to which an additional dollar of income entitles an 
individual. The disparity in NMSSTR across racial groups is caused by differences in 
mortality rates. In our calculations we incorporate variation across racial and income 
groups. We find that the progressivity of the benefit schedule of Social Security is 
affected by differences in life expectancy. We discuss what differences in the marginal 
return on Social Security imply in terms of optimal tax theory and the likely effects of 
differences in the NMSSTR on labor force participation and income inequality.  
Social Security is a pay-as-you-go system and generates intergenerational 
transfers of income between workers and retirees. At current regulations and 
demographic tendencies, Social Security produces inequality in services across future 
generations. According to Rawls‟ theory of justice (1971, 1975, 1999), a just social 
contract is one to which we would agree if we did not know in advance where we 
ourselves would end up within the rules. In this regard, those cohorts who do not live 
long and are aware that their lives will be short would object to the state in which all 
contribute the same amount of resources but receive benefits according to how long they 
live. In the second essay, we show that, at the fixed normal retirement age and ever 
increasing life expectancy, Social Security is bound to bring gains for younger 
generations that are not produced by economic growth. This essay describes fairness 
concerns related to the services Social Security provides across cohorts. We suggest a 
policy that imposes a level of equality in returns to Social Security by age cohort. Our 
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proposition is that the normal retirement age should be determined for every age cohort 
so that expected benefits relative to contributions are the same for all age cohorts. Our 
objective is to search for an initial level of benefits to contributions ratio that would make 
the expected balance of Social Security positive in the long term.  
There are a number of arguments in favor of using retirement age to impose 
intergenerational equality in Social Security. First, the demographic trends are more 
robust and can be projected with greater accuracy than economic or financial indicators. 
Second, the demographic trend is one of the main causes of the long term imbalance in 
Social Security. Finally, the fixed retirement age and rising life expectancy undermine the 
original purpose of Social Security, namely old-age insurance. We conduct stochastic 
projections of the balance of Social Security under the proposed retirement scheme.  
We also calculate the retirement age and estimate the balance in the Social 
Security Trust Fund for the period 1957 – 2005. We show that under a fair retirement 
scheme, Social Security could be kept in sound financial condition throughout its history. 
Our results show that the amendments of 1983 would be unnecessary if the retirement 
age was set for each age cohort based on its life expectancy at retirement.  
Our results are timely and contribute to the current debate over social security 
policy reforms.  The 1983 amendments were necessary for the fiscal viability of the 
system, but were not sufficient.  We offer a reasonable and fair policy that will restore 
fiscal health to the social security system in the future. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
NET MARGINAL SOCIAL SECURITY TAX RATE BY RACIAL AND INCOME 
GROUPS 
 
2.1. Introduction  
The objective of this essay is to calculate the Net Marginal Social Security Tax 
Rate (NMSSTR) for different racial and age groups following Feldstein and Samwick 
(1992). NMSSTR is the difference between the social security tax and the present value 
of future benefits to which an additional dollar of income entitles an individual. Only 
individual and survivor retirement benefits are taken into account in calculating these net 
marginal tax rates, and disability is ignored. It is difficult to obtain a credible measure of 
the probability of somebody becoming disabled over his or her lifetime. On the other 
hand, the expected value of individual and survivor retirement benefits can be estimated 
based on each demographic group‟s mortality rates. Following Feldstein and Samwick‟s 
methodology, we estimate the net marginal tax rate of a particular group by subtracting 
the present value of future benefits, weighted by survival and discount rates, from the 
statutory Social Security tax rate. We calculate NMSSTR for different age, sex and racial 
groups. Armour and Pitts (2004) extend this basic procedure by adding the probability of 
a particular individual being eligible for Social Security benefits, which depends on the 
number of years the individual makes payments to Social Security and differential 
mortality rates for different income groups.  
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There are several incentives to conduct a study like this. One of them is related to 
the progressivity of the Social Security program. Progressivity is a feature that almost all 
modern tax systems possess. The rationale is to make the tax burden more equitable: 
wealthier people can afford to pay higher taxes than poorer people. But in reality, 
seemingly progressive or non-regressive tax schedules can impose regressive effective 
marginal tax rates. The most common example is the sales tax. It can become regressive 
because low income people spend most of their earnings. The structure of Social Security 
benefits is progressive, i.e. low income workers have higher marginal replacement rates; 
a larger share of their average lifetime earnings is paid back as retirement benefits.  
However, if the mortality difference between low income and other workers is high 
enough, then effectively the benefit schedule may be regressive because low income 
workers may not live long enough to collect those benefits.  
Another incentive to conduct a study like this is the labor incentive effect of any 
income tax. Different demographic groups may have different labor elasticities; for 
example, married women have greater labor supply elasticities than single men or women 
or married men (Hausman 1985). This fact makes it interesting to study whether the tax 
and benefits of the Social Security program create distortionary effects on the incentives 
to work for different groups. Optimal tax theory suggests that efficiency is achieved only 
if the effective marginal tax rate is inversely proportional to the compensated wage 
elasticity of labor supply. There have been a number of empirical studies providing 
evidence of higher labor supply elasticities for younger workers and workers from 
minority groups (Silberberg 1985; Juhn et al. 1991). A high NMSSTR for young black 
workers implies that the social security tax imposes distorting incentives for this group. 
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Other studies (Grogger 1995, 1997) have found that younger workers, especially young 
black workers, are more responsive to the difference in returns in the legal and illegal 
economies. Therefore, a low return from Social Security for young black workers may 
contribute to their participation in illegal activities or encourage them to work in the 
informal sector. We are not trying to explain the effects of the Social Security tax on 
labor force participation decisions of different racial and age groups, but we believe that 
noticeable differences in effective net marginal tax rate across racial groups suggest that 
the Social Security program has explanatory power in these decisions because the net 
marginal Social Security tax rate is virtually a rate of return on Social Security from an 
additional dollar of earnings.  
One other proposition that makes calculating NMSSTR for different racial groups 
interesting is that Social Security may be contributing to the wealth gap between white 
and black workers who have otherwise similar characteristics.  
Our purpose is to estimate the net marginal tax rate for different racial groups. 
Previous studies have looked at differences by sex and age (Feldstein and Samwick 1992; 
Armour and Pitts 2004). Surprisingly, we have not found any study in the literature that 
estimates the effective tax rate at the margin for different racial groups, although it is 
known that mortality rates and life expectancies differ by race. Our research fills this gap 
in the literature. There has been research on lifetime returns of Social Security to 
minorities (Liebman 2001; Duggan et al. 1993), but it is interesting to estimate the net 
marginal tax rate by race for the reasons mentioned above.  
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2.2. Methodology and Literature  
Gordon (1983), Browning (1985), and Burkhauser and Turner (1985) are among 
the early literature on the effective marginal rate that incorporated the subsequent benefits 
to which a worker was entitled upon retirement. Feldstein and Samwick (1992) extend 
their methodology with sex specific mortality rates and estimate net marginal social 
security tax rates separately for males and females in three different income groups. They 
find that the marginal tax rate decreases with age, since a randomly selected older person 
has a better chance of living until retirement than a younger person. Another reason is 
that the discount factor of future benefits is smaller for older people. Feldstein and 
Samwick find that women face a noticeably lower net marginal tax rate thanks to their 
higher life expectancy. The finding that the younger population faces a higher net 
marginal tax rate implies that social security may be imposing incentive distortions on 
labor supply decisions, discouraging younger people from working more hours. Feldstein 
and Samwick suggest that one of the solutions to this problem could be to increase the 
weight placed on earlier years‟ income in calculation of the Average Indexed Monthly 
Earnings (AIME), which is the base for determining monthly social security benefits. 
With regard to the sex gap, they believe it could be consistent with efficiency 
considerations. Since labor supply elasticities are higher for women than men, the 
optimal tax must be lower for women.  
Armour and Pitts (2002) suggest that the assumption that any worker would be 
fully insured by the time she is retired could be relaxed. An individual is eligible for 
social security benefits only if she is fully insured. Although the majority of workers 
become fully insured after 10 years of work, women have a lower probability of being 
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insured due to their shorter work histories. Armour and Pitts incorporate the probability 
of an individual of certain sex and age being fully insured by retirement into the net 
marginal tax rates. They also account for the fact that mortality rates can differ not only 
by age and sex, but also by income group. Similar to Feldstein and Samwick, they find 
that net marginal tax rates decline with age and are higher for males than for the same age 
females. The lower insurance probability for females reduces the sex differential. 
Accounting for mortality differentials across income groups does not remove the 
progressivity of the benefits schedule, but it does reduce it.  
Social security benefits are based on average lifetime earnings of a retired worker. 
The measure of average lifetime earnings used to determine social security benefits is 
called the Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME). We assume that individuals start 
working at 21 and retire at the normal retirement age. Earnings of a worker through age 
60 are indexed by an indexing factor, which is equal to the ratio of population average 
earnings in the year an individual attains age 60 to population average earnings in each 
year. Thus a worker who earns 1% of the national average throughout his life will have 
AIME equal to 1% of the national average at age 60. One other feature needs to be taken 
into account. All employees have an option to drop up to five years of their lowest years 
of earnings to reduce the effect of those years when an employee is unemployed or 
allocating time to raising children. Because only earnings up to the age of 60 are indexed, 
the number of years on which AIME is based is 35. AIME for an individual retiring at age 
66 is: 
t
At t
T E
E
E
AIME
12
1
35
1
 
(1) 
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where 
tE  and TE  are average earnings and T is the year when an individual 
attains 60. tE is an individual‟s actual earning in year t. A denotes the set of all years 
through age 60 that are counted into the best 35. We assume that the best 35 will occur at 
ages 26 through 60. That means that the lowest earnings occur in the earliest five years.  
Once AIME is determined, the Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) -- monthly 
benefits payable -- is calculated. In 2009 the PIA was based on the formula below: 
PIA= 
90%(AIME<$744)+32%($744<AIME<$4483)+15%($4483<AIME) 
 
(2) 
The Net Marginal Social Security Tax Rate, T
~
, is the difference between the 
statutory rate, T, which is defined as the combined employee-employer legislated rate, 
and the present value of the change in expected future benefits, PVB . So PVBTT
~
. In 
2009 the combined employee-employer tax rate was 12.4 percent. Half of the tax 
technically is paid by the company and half is paid by the employee. But it has been 
found that employees‟ wages are reduced by the full amount of the payroll tax (Brittain 
1972). Therefore our estimations assume that the tax incidence falls fully on labor.  
The present value of the change in expected future benefits resulting from a one-
dollar increase in earnings is: 
ja
j
a
PV ajPg
AIME
PIA
B 11
35
1 100
66
0,60max
 
(3) 
where 
AIME
PIA
 is the marginal replacement rate, g is the growth rate of average 
worker earnings, a is the age of an individual, ajP rs,  is the probability of an individual 
17 
 
of sex s and race r surviving from age a to age j, and δ is the discount rate. We assume 
that everybody is dead by the age of 101. We also ignore the income tax on social 
security benefits. There are two further assumptions we need to make. We assume that 
the real average wage growth rate is 1% and the discount rate is 3%. We take these 
assumptions on recommendations from the 2000 Social Security Board of Trustees 
Report.  
The marginal replacement rate 
AIME
PIA
depends on which income category a 
worker falls into according to benefit formula “bend points”. If a worker‟s current 
average monthly earnings is below the first “bend point” ($744 in 2009), then her 
marginal replacement rate is 90%. We call this category of employee low income 
workers. Similarly, if the average worker‟s lifetime average earnings is between $744 and 
$4483 per month and their marginal replacement rate is 32%, we call this category 
middle income workers. High income employees average monthly earnings indexed up to 
2009 are above $4483 and below $8900, and their additional dollar of earnings is 
replaced at 15%. Workers with higher average earnings greater than $8900 per month 
neither pay Social Security tax nor receive extra benefits at the margin.  
We calculated net marginal tax rates based on life tables for the year of 2004 
published in 2007; this is the last life table available from the Department of Health and 
Human Services. These life tables contain information on the number of survivors by sex, 
age and race for every 100,000 newborns. The probability of an individual of sex s 
surviving from age a to age j is 
a
j
s
l
l
ajP , where lj and la are the numbers of survivors 
aged j and a respectively. The life tables do not account for differential mortality rates 
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across different income groups. We estimate life tables that account for differential 
mortality using mortality ratios. The mortality ratio is the ratio of one group‟s death rate 
to that of the population. Life tables for certain demographic groups present estimates of 
mortality ratios for different age and income groups. The mortality ratio for low income 
workers is 
aT
aL
q
q
M
,
,
, where qL,a and qT,a are mortality rates (number of deaths per 1000 
population) for low income workers and the total population. The mortality rate for low 
income workers is 
aTaL qMq ,,  given the mortality rate for the total population. 
Mortality rates by sex and age for low income workers are subtracted from one and 
multiplied by the number of low income persons that survived to age a to estimate the 
number of low income persons by sex and race surviving to age a+1. The number of 
average/high income persons of sex s and race r surviving to age a is estimated by 
subtracting the number of low income survivors from the total number of survivors. The 
number of survivors at each age in their respective income classes is then used to 
calculate the probability that a person aged a will survive to age j. For each income class 
the survival probabilities are in turn used to calculate BPV. Mortality ratios, M, for low 
income males and females aged 20-64 are 1.73 and 1.15 respectively. Those for low 
income males and females aged 65 and higher are 1.5 and 1.7 respectively (Armour and 
Pitts 2004; Duleep 1995). 
For example, consider a white female aged 50 in 2004, who is a lifetime average 
earner and will retire in 2016 at age 66, which is the normal retirement age based on 1983 
Amendments. Suppose in 2004 she receives a one dollar increase in her income. 
Assuming real average earnings grow at a rate of one percent, her extra dollar of earnings 
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is indexed by 
0,60max
1
a
g =1.1 (earnings are indexed through age 60). So her average 
indexed annual earnings increase by 0314.01.1
35
1
. Since she is an average earner and 
her marginal replacement rate is 0.32, then her PIA would increase by 0.32·0.0314=0.01. 
The present value of the change in expected future benefits from a one-dollar increase in 
earnings is 0.01
j
fj
rjP
50
100
66
150 . Assuming the discount rate is three percent, the 
discounted sum of survival probabilities times the increase in monthly benefits for a 
white female aged 50 is 0.083777. Subtracting BPV from the statutory rate, we receive 
T
~
= 0.0402 or 4.02 percent. Note the year that the one dollar increase in an individual‟s 
income occurs may not be included in her best 35 years and not affect her AIME. In that 
case the marginal tax rate is the full 12.4%, because this dollar does not affect the 
individual‟s benefits. We assume the years of highest earnings are when an individual is 
25 to 60 years old.  
The calculation of the marginal tax rate for a worker with a dependent spouse is 
more complicated. We consider the scenario of a male worker with a spouse who is two 
years younger than him. The rules of Social Security are such that the dependent spouse 
can draw benefits both when her husband is alive and dead. If the husband is alive and 
retired, then the wife can receive benefits equal to half of her husband‟s benefits. In other 
words, the benefits paid to a male worker increase by 50% if both he and his wife are 
alive when he retires. If the male worker dies at any point in time, his wife will draw his 
benefits as long as she is older than 60. This applies to our case because the rules actually 
say she can draw starting the year her husband turns 62. So in order to calculate the 
increase in benefits paid to a male worker with a dependent spouse we need to add three 
20 
 
different streams of benefits: one that is paid to him if he was not married, 50% of that 
amount if he and his wife are both alive and retired, and his benefits if he died and his 
wife is alive and older than 60. If we denote the age of the husband as a and the age of 
the wife as a – 2, then the formula for the increase in total benefits for a married male 
worker is: 
100
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(4) 
The first term shows how much the present value of benefits would change if they 
were paid to his wife as a survivor. aiPaiP mm 1  is the probability of the male 
worker dying at age i. Since aiPm  is the probability that a worker at age a survives to 
age i, then the difference in the two survival probabilities is the probability of death in 
between. Then in the same term there follows the change in the amount of benefits 
weighted by the discounted probability of survival of the wife after the age of 60 or the 
age of death of the husband, whichever is later. The whole product has to be summed 
over all ages of death of the husband.  
The second term is simple. It is the same as if the male worker was single or if his 
wife drew benefits based on her own earnings. It measures the increase in the present 
value of the benefits that he will draw for himself.  
The third term is the change in benefits that the wife would draw if both were 
alive and retired. The multiplier ½ shows it is half of what her husband draws in benefits. 
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Then there is the change in benefits weighted by the probabilities of survival of both 
spouses.  
We consider the example of an average lifetime black male earner of age 45 and 
his wife of age 43 in 2004. The probability of the husband dying at the age of 45 is 0.07. 
His extra dollar of earnings in the current year is indexed by 
0,60max
1
a
g  = 1.16. So 
his average indexed annual earnings increase by 0332.016.1
35
1
. Since he is an 
average earner and his marginal replacement rate is 0.32, then her PIA would increase by 
0.32·0.0332=0.011. The discounted sum of survival probabilities of his wife is 6.05. If 
the husband dies at the age of 45, the present value of benefits for the wife will increase 
by 0.064. Multiplying by the probability of death of the husband gives us 0.0045. If we 
aggregate over all years of possible death, we obtain 0.078 or 7.80%.  This means that an 
additional dollar of earnings of the husband in the current year increases the wife‟s 
benefits as a survivor by 7.8%. The second term in (4) is similar to the case of benefits of 
a worker who is single or does not have a dependent spouse.  Those benefits increase by 
5.15% ; we can simply look it up in the table for workers without dependents. The third 
term, the case when both spouses are alive and retired, is equal to 1.9%. The calculation 
of the third term is similar to the previous one, except we weight the benefits by the 
probabilities of survival of both spouses and divide the benefits in half. Adding all three 
terms we receive BPV = 0.1298. Subtracting BPV from the statutory rate, we have  
T
~
= -.0058 or -0.58%.  
One of the objectives of this study is to see what the effective tax rate across 
racial and sex groups implies in terms of optimal tax theory. We expect to find that 
current demographic tendencies and Social Security stipulations impose efficiency and 
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welfare distortions. We can speculate on what effect the net marginal tax rate may have 
on life cycle work, consumption and savings patterns, based on a common literature and 
theoretical framework.  
 
2.3. Results 
In Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 we have the first set of estimates of NMSSTR. Table 
2.1 shows the results for the white population that do not account for mortality 
differentials across income groups; Table 2.2 has similar results for the black population. 
Even if there is disparity in life expectancy, we can see that the benefit structure of Social 
Security is highly progressive, i.e. higher income groups face higher net marginal tax 
rates. Most age groups in the low income group have net positive returns from the Social 
Security program. The reason is that low income individuals enjoy high replacement 
rates; a low income worker contributes 12.4% of her marginal income to Social Security 
and receives 90% of it in benefits after retirement. The probability of death and the 
discount rate close this otherwise big gap between revenues and costs. But what stands 
out is that the poorest black males up to the age of 40 do not get positive marginal returns 
from Social Security. The other demographic groups that face net positive marginal tax 
rates are the youngest white males and youngest black females. The main reason why the 
youngest black males in the low income category get negative marginal tax rates is 
because their mortality rate is very high. In fact, a working age black male is almost twice 
as likely to die in any given year as a similar white male. Only after age 60 does the 
disparity in mortality start to fall. Note that in this analysis we assumed that everybody is 
fully insured. But the eligibility for full insurance depends on both the number of years of 
23 
 
covered employment and income earned in those years. Normally most workers get full 
insurance status with ten years of covered employment, but it may take longer for part-
time workers and low wage earners; low income younger blacks are more likely to be 
 
 
Table 2.1 
Net Marginal Social Security Tax Estimates by Sex, Age and Income Classification in 
2004: White Population, Not Accounting for Differential Mortality by Income 
          
 Total Population Male Female 
Age 
Low 
Income 
Average 
Income 
High 
Income 
Low 
Income 
Average 
Income 
High 
Income 
Low 
Income 
Average 
Income 
High 
Income 
25 -2.15 6.07 8.47 -0.79 6.55 8.70 -3.43 5.61 8.26 
30 -3.53 5.58 8.25 -2.04 6.11 8.49 -4.91 5.08 8.01 
35 -5.06 5.03 7.99 -3.43 5.61 8.26 -6.57 4.50 7.74 
40 -6.79 4.42 7.70 -5.02 5.05 8.00 -8.42 3.84 7.43 
45 -8.78 3.71 7.37 -6.85 4.39 7.69 -10.54 3.09 7.08 
50 -11.10 2.89 6.98 -9.03 3.62 7.33 -12.96 2.22 6.67 
55 -13.85 1.91 6.52 -11.65 2.69 6.89 -15.81 1.21 6.20 
60 -17.30 0.68 5.95 -15.00 1.50 6.33 -19.29 -0.03 5.62 
61 -18.38 0.30 5.77 -16.04 1.13 6.16 -20.39 -0.42 5.44 
62 -19.54 -0.12 5.58 -17.17 0.73 5.97 -21.56 -0.83 5.24 
63 -20.76 -0.55 5.37 -18.37 0.30 5.77 -22.79 -1.27 5.03 
64 -22.08 -1.02 5.15 -19.67 -0.16 5.55 -24.11 -1.74 4.82 
65 -23.49 -1.52 4.92 -21.07 -0.66 5.32 -25.51 -2.24 4.58 
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Table 2.2 
Net Marginal Social Security Tax Estimates by Sex, Age and Income Classification in 
2004: Black Population, Not Accounting for Differential Mortality by Income 
  
 Total Population Male Female 
Age 
Low 
Income 
Average 
Income 
High 
Income 
Low 
Income 
Average 
Income 
High 
Income 
Low 
Income 
Average 
Income 
High 
Income 
25 2.17 8.76 10.69 3.91 9.38 10.98 0.63 8.21 10.44 
30 1.02 8.35 10.50 2.92 9.03 10.82 -0.64 7.76 10.23 
35 -0.27 7.89 10.29 1.80 8.63 10.63 -2.08 7.25 9.99 
40 -1.76 7.36 10.04 0.51 8.17 10.42 -3.73 6.67 9.71 
45 -3.53 6.73 9.74 -1.04 7.62 10.16 -5.67 5.98 9.39 
50 -5.71 5.96 9.38 -3.01 6.92 9.83 -7.98 5.15 9.00 
55 -8.46 4.98 8.92 -5.58 6.01 9.40 -10.83 4.14 8.53 
60 -12.10 3.69 8.32 -9.10 4.76 8.82 -14.46 2.85 7.92 
61 -13.22 3.29 8.13 -10.19 4.37 8.63 -15.60 2.44 7.73 
62 -14.42 2.87 7.93 -11.36 3.95 8.44 -16.79 2.02 7.54 
63 -15.72 2.40 7.71 -12.64 3.50 8.23 -18.07 1.56 7.32 
64 -17.12 1.90 7.48 -14.03 3.00 7.99 -19.47 1.07 7.09 
65 -18.63 1.37 7.23 -15.54 2.47 7.74 -20.94 0.54 6.84 
 
 
part time and low wage earners. In reality the effective marginal tax rate may be even 
higher than what these estimates show. 
For all older groups, people face lower net marginal social security taxes because 
they have higher conditional probabilities of reaching retirement than younger people. 
Because they have fewer remaining working years, the discount factor is also smaller for 
older people. As Feldstein and Samwick (1992) noted, large negative marginal tax rates 
in later years of life will create distortions towards greater labor supply in later years, 
because they effectively subsidize labor in those years. We do include in our estimates 
anyone who is younger than 25 years old. It is most likely that for the youngest workers 
the net marginal tax rate will be equal to the statutory rate of 12.4%, since most workers 
have their lowest earnings in their earliest years and must drop the first five years of 
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earnings from the AIME calculation. Therefore, the incentive distortions must be more 
pronounced than our results suggest. We find that the difference in the net marginal tax 
rate across age groups is more noticeable for low income groups because their relatively 
greater rate of return is discounted for this group. Women in all income, age and racial 
groups bear a lower NMSSTR than men due to their longer life expectancy. Lower net 
marginal taxes for low wage workers and female workers are consistent with efficiency 
considerations because these categories of workers have been found to have higher labor 
supply elasticities than other workers (Juhn et al. 1991; Killingsworth 1983).  
The difference in the net marginal social security tax between same age whites 
and blacks also increases during most of their working lifetime. The disparity only starts 
to close after age 55 when the difference in life expectancy begins to shrink. A low 
income black male aged 25 faces a 2.89 percentage lower net return on Social Security 
than his white counterpart. This difference rises until it reaches 4.28 for 55 year olds. The 
racial disparity in net marginal tax between average and high income workers is much 
narrower, but follows the same pattern. The disparity among females is smaller because 
of the smaller gap in life expectancy between white females and black females.  
 Table 2.2 presents the estimates of the NMSSTR for the white population which 
takes into consideration differential mortality between income groups. As expected new 
estimates show greater net marginal tax rates for the low income group as they have 
lower life expectancy than other groups. The difference is rather noticeable and steadily 
increasing for older workers; it starts at 2.88 percentage points for 25 year old males and 
reaches 4.74 for 64 year olds. The presence of this variation is explained by the fact that 
low income workers have higher than average (on which earlier estimates are based) 
26 
 
mortality rates, and this difference becomes larger as people grow older. On the other 
hand, workers with average and high income bear lower net marginal tax rates since they 
live longer than an average individual. But the difference is not as big as in the case of 
low income workers; workers with higher income receive lower benefits relative to their 
average lifetime income. 
 With regard to female workers, we can see that the variation in earlier years is 
smaller in absolute terms but greater in later years. This is because the adverse effect of 
low income on mortality of females is relatively smaller in their younger ages and 
becomes greater in their older ages.  
In Table 2.3 we present similar estimates for black workers. We observe a similar 
pattern, and the difference between the common mortality net marginal rate and the 
differential mortality net marginal tax rate is greater for blacks than for whites. 
Differential mortality slightly reduces the progressivity of the net marginal social security 
tax. The benefit structure of Social Security is highly progressive, and the gap in life 
expectancy across different income groups cannot remove this feature.  
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Table 2.3 
Net Marginal Social Security Tax Estimates by Sex, Age and Income in 2004:  
White Population, Accounting for Differential Mortality by Income 
 
 Total Population Male Female 
Age 
Low 
Income 
Average 
Income 
High 
Income 
Low 
Income 
Average 
Income 
High 
Income 
Low 
Income 
Average 
Income 
High 
Income 
25 2.53 7.61 10.16 3.95 8.09 10.38 0.94 7.18 9.95 
30 1.43 7.10 9.92 2.98 7.62 10.16 -0.28 6.63 9.70 
35 0.20 6.53 9.65 1.90 7.10 9.92 -1.63 6.02 9.41 
40 -1.22 5.89 9.35 0.63 6.51 9.64 -3.16 5.33 9.09 
45 -2.88 5.16 9.00 -0.88 5.84 9.32 -4.91 4.55 8.72 
50 -4.90 4.31 8.61 -2.75 5.04 8.95 -6.93 3.65 8.30 
55 -7.41 3.32 8.14 -5.12 4.10 8.51 -9.31 2.60 7.81 
60 -10.77 2.10 7.57 -8.39 2.92 7.96 -12.27 1.32 7.20 
61 -11.82 1.71 7.39 -9.40 2.55 7.78 -13.20 0.91 7.01 
62 -12.97 1.30 7.20 -10.53 2.15 7.60 -14.20 0.48 6.81 
63 -14.20 0.87 7.00 -11.75 1.73 7.40 -15.25 0.03 6.60 
64 -15.56 0.41 6.78 -13.10 1.28 7.19 -16.38 -0.46 6.37 
65 -16.96 -0.09 6.55 -14.49 0.78 6.95 -17.76 -0.95 6.14 
 
Table 2.4 displays the NMSSTR for black workers taking differential mortality 
into account. The gap in the marginal return from Social Security follows the pattern 
similar to the case with a common mortality rate. For example, the difference in the net 
marginal tax rate between white male workers and black male workers starts at 3.09 
percentage for 25 year olds and peaks at 4.76 percent for 55 year olds; the difference falls 
slightly as the disparity in life expectancy narrows.  
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Table 2.4 
Net Marginal Social Security Tax Estimates by Sex, Age and Income Classification in 
2004: Black Population, Accounting for Differential Mortality by Income  
          
 Total Population Male Female 
Age 
Low 
Income 
Average 
Income 
High 
Income 
Low 
Income 
Average 
Income 
High 
Income 
Low 
Income 
Average 
Income 
High 
Income 
25 5.42 8.48 10.56 7.04 9.10 10.86 3.80 7.93 10.31 
30 4.59 8.04 10.36 6.36 8.73 10.68 2.84 7.46 10.08 
35 3.64 7.56 10.13 5.59 8.31 10.48 1.73 6.92 9.83 
40 2.51 7.00 9.87 4.66 7.82 10.25 0.43 6.30 9.54 
45 1.11 6.34 9.56 3.50 7.25 9.98 -1.16 5.59 9.21 
50 -0.71 5.55 9.19 1.91 6.53 9.65 -3.16 4.75 8.81 
55 -3.20 4.57 8.73 -0.36 5.61 9.22 -5.76 3.73 8.33 
60 -6.78 3.29 8.13 -3.81 4.38 8.64 -9.35 2.45 7.74 
61 -7.90 2.90 7.95 -4.89 4.00 8.46 -10.46 2.05 7.55 
62 -9.09 2.48 7.75 -6.06 3.59 8.27 -11.65 1.63 7.35 
63 -10.43 2.03 7.54 -7.40 3.15 8.06 -12.96 1.18 7.14 
64 -11.92 1.54 7.31 -8.88 2.66 7.84 -14.41 0.69 6.91 
65 -13.42 1.01 7.06 -10.39 2.14 7.59 -15.88 0.17 6.67 
 
Finally, we turn to Table 2.5, which presents net marginal tax rates for a male 
with a dependent spouse. We already showed how the effective marginal tax rate for a 
black male aged 45 with a dependent spouse is equal to -0.58%. The components of the 
marginal benefits that an additional dollar of income to which this worker is entitled are: 
benefits that he is expected to collect himself which increase by 5.15%, benefits that his 
wife is expected to collect when he dies which increase by 5.92%, and the benefits his 
wife will collect if they are both alive which rise by 1.9%. It is interesting that the 
benefits he is expected to receive himself are lower than what his wife as a survivor 
would collect when he dies. It shows how a large disparity in life expectancy between 
black males and black females is reflected in the benefit components. For comparison, 
the increase in benefits for a white male aged 45 with a dependent spouse is split as: 
6.56% for himself, 2.13% for his wife when they are both alive, and 5.7% in survivor 
benefits. Again the fact that a sizeable share of future benefits is for a survivor is the 
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reflection of the greater likelihood of the male spouse dying first, but the sex difference in 
mortality is lower among white workers than among black workers 
Table 2.5 
 
Net Marginal Social Security Tax for a Married Employee With a Dependent Spouse: 
White and Black Populations, Accounting for Differential Mortality by Income 
 
 
 
 
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The last column in Table 2.5 is for dependent female spouses. A spouse is 
dependent if she is non-working or she is working but her earnings are much lower than 
her husband‟s earnings so that she qualifies for benefits as a dependent. Her net marginal 
tax rate is 12.4% or the full statutory rate because her additional earnings do not affect 
her benefits.  
There are households where each spouse draws benefits based on his and her own 
earnings, but even in those households, the lower earning spouse is entitled to the higher 
 
     
White     
Age 
Male without 
dependent 
spouse 
Female without 
dependent 
spouse 
Male with 
dependent 
spouse 
Female 
dependent 
spouse 
25 8.09 7.18 1.12 12.4 
35 7.10 6.02 0.55 12.4 
45 5.84 4.55 -1.27 12.4 
55 4.10 2.60 -3.81 12.4 
60 2.92 1.32 -5.37 12.4 
 
 
Black     
Age 
Male without 
dependent 
spouse 
Female without 
dependent 
spouse 
Male with 
dependent 
spouse 
Female 
dependent 
spouse 
25 9.10 7.93 1.44 12.4 
35 8.31 6.92 1.10 12.4 
45 7.25 5.59 -0.58 12.4 
55 5.61 3.73 -3.09 12.4 
60 4.38 2.45 -4.74 12.4 
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earning spouse‟s benefits if the latter dies first. The marginal tax rate for the primary 
earner in cases like this can be calculated similar to those with a dependent spouse. We 
do not include the portion of benefits that are received by the secondary earner when both 
spouses are alive. The increase in benefits for a married 45 year old black male is, 
therefore, the sum of 5.15% and 5.92%, and for his white counterpart it is the sum of 
6.56% and 5.7%.  
Based on our findings, we conclude that unequal marginal tax rates may distort 
the labor supply decisions of married and unmarried workers. In families where the 
husband earns more than the wife, the husband is encouraged to work more, while the 
wife is encouraged to work less. These effects are larger for black families than for white 
families.  
 
2.4. Implications 
Race is frequently brought into the debate over Social Security reform. Many 
support the claim that the return to Social Security for blacks is lower than for whites due 
to the lower life expectancy of the former group. But none of these claims are based on 
the return at the margin rather than the total return on investment. Two frequently cited 
empirical papers that support this claim (Beach and Davis 1998; Panis and Lillard 1996) 
use a similar methodology. They consider paid taxes as a series of investments. The 
Social Security rate of return is the rate of return on payroll taxes that would buy an 
annuity upon retirement equal to the Social Security benefits. This yield is the difference 
between benefits payments and the amounts paid through payroll taxes. In other words, 
they simulate the representative individual and estimate the rate of return this 
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representative type can expect to receive. Beach and Davis find that young low income 
workers will receive only a 1.23 percent rate of return on payroll taxes, while black low 
earners actually face a negative rate of return. Their study implies that if these workers 
were permitted to convert the payroll taxes into safe market investments, they would be 
considerably better off upon retirement. Panis and Lillard also note that lower rates of 
return for black workers imply that they subsidize the retirement of white workers. We 
found that black workers bear noticeably greater net marginal taxes than white workers, 
with the difference ranging from 2.52 to 4.22 percentage points. This implies that Social 
Security does not close the wealth gap between workers of different races but otherwise 
with similar characteristics. On the contrary, it contributes to it. The lower return on 
Social Security for younger workers could also imply that it affects the decision by young 
men to pursue activities in the informal or illegal economies. Grogger (1997) found that 
young workers were very sensitive to the difference in returns in formal and informal 
sectors. 
The advocates of the Social Security system (Diamond and Orszag 2004; 
Liebman 2005) believe that the black population in general benefits more. Because the 
benefit schedule is highly progressive and a greater share of the black population is low 
income, then black workers enjoy a higher replacement rate than white workers. They 
also claim that black households receive more disability and survivors‟ benefits. The 
Social Security Administration provides the following figures. While black workers 
account for 11 percent of the labor force, they comprise 18 percent of workers receiving 
disability benefits. Although black children comprise about 16 percent of all children in 
the United States, they make up 24 percent receiving survivor benefits.  
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The benefit structure of Social Security made it highly progressive. Accounting 
for differential mortality rates reduces somewhat this feature of the Social Security 
program, but it cannot totally remove it.   
The implications of the effective marginal tax rate on labor supply are based on 
the assumption that workers see the link between the tax they pay on additional earnings 
today and the benefits to which these tax payments entitle them when they retire. 
Unfortunately, we could not find any literature that studies how Social Security benefits 
affect working hours. Liebman et al. (2008, 1) write, “To our knowledge, no papers have 
examined whether the effective Social Security tax rate affects labor supply as measured 
by hours or earnings”. But there is considerable literature that studies how Social Security 
influences the retirement decision. Again, most of this literature does not look at tax and 
benefit rates at the margin, but instead considers the overall wealth effect of Social 
Security (Diamond and Gruber 1999; Coile and Gruber 2000). Liebman et al. (2006) 
propose a methodology that uses the rule of 35 years highest earnings to examine how the 
earnings in the year which is being replaced by the current year‟s earnings affect 
workers‟ decision to retire. They hypothesize that the higher the earnings that are being 
replaced in the formula for AIME, because they are lower than the current year‟s 
earnings, the more likely is the worker to retire. Since the change in AIME is directly 
related to marginal benefits, this test relates the marginal benefits, hence the effective tax 
rate, to labor supply. Using data for workers aged 50 and older from the Health and 
Retirement Study, a longitudinal survey, Liebman et al. find empirical evidence that 
higher annual earnings in the year replaced in the AIME formula increase the retirement 
hazard. Again their paper studies the retirement decision instead of hours worked, but 
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they are looking at the effect of Social Security at the margin rather than its overall 
wealth effect. It supports our assumption at least to some degree that workers see the link 
between the tax rate and additional benefits.  
 
2.5. Conclusion 
In this essay, we estimated the net marginal Social Security tax rate across age, 
sex and racial groups. The effective marginal tax rate depends on earnings, mortality 
rates, and marital status. There is literature that conducts similar exercises for age and sex 
groups. We contribute to this literature by accounting for differences by race. We find 
that the Social Security tax and benefits schedules which are designed to be progressive 
preserve this feature when differential mortality is accounted not only across racial 
groups, but also income groups. Predictably, different mortality rates across income 
groups reduce the progressivity of Social Security. We showed that the effective marginal 
Social Security tax rate was higher for black workers compared to white workers. It is 
clear that Social Security contributes to the wealth gap between workers of different races 
but who are similar otherwise. There also is a literature that argues that the black 
population in general benefits more when children and disabilities are taken into account. 
Unequal marginal tax rates across age cohorts and racial groups impose distortionary 
effects on labor supply of different categories of workers, based on the assumption that 
workers see the link between the tax they pay today and the future benefits to which they 
are entitled.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
NORMAL RETIREMENT AGE UNDER EQUALITY OF SOCIAL SECURITY 
ACROSS AGE COHORTS 
 
3.1. Introduction 
The first widely available federal assistance to the disabled and dependents in the 
United States started with the Union army pension program in 1862. At the beginning it 
was a modest benefits program covering only severely injured soldiers and their 
dependents, but over time the program increased benefits and expanded coverage so that 
any veteran who served in the Civil War could claim benefits due to either age or 
disability. By the beginning of the 20
th
 century, social reformers started to discuss the 
possibility of transforming the veterans‟ pension into a general old-age pension program. 
In 1909 American sociologist Charles Henderson wrote: “The nation and the states have 
already declared it to be our duty to shelter the aged and wounded soldier, why should the 
victims of the „army of labor‟ be neglected?" (Henderson 1909, 308). But the 
transformation of the Union army pension into a federal old-age pension program did not 
materialize. Instead state, not federal, old-age pension programs were adopted in the 
1920s.  The Great Depression severely affected the operation of these programs; the 
number of pensioners increased, and the cost of benefits rose sharply. The ability of most 
states to finance their programs weakened dramatically. Under these circumstances, 
Congress considered the possibility of federal participation (Weaver 1982). 
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In 1935 Congress passed the Social Security Act. When Social Security was first 
created it resembled a private insurance program. It was more like a government 
administered annuity system. First, Old Age Insurance was designed to be actuarially 
fair. The benefits were determined by the cumulative wage history of a worker rather 
than the average wage. If a worker died before reaching the age of 65, he or she would 
receive a “money back guarantee” which was equal to the worker‟s contributions plus 
interest. Second, the program covered only workers in industry and commerce excluding 
agricultural workers, government workers, and the self-employed. There were also some 
features attributed to a transfer program -- for example, a slightly progressive benefits 
formula favoring lower income workers. In this setup the program would be fair across 
generations because each generation‟s benefits would be determined by their own 
contributions. In fact, it would feature intergenerational equity and individual equity. 
In 1939, before Social Security paid its first benefits, major amendments were 
adopted. Social Security was transformed into a pay-as-you-go system. As a result, 
workers who retired in the early stages of Social Security received very high returns on 
their tax payments. Most of these retirees received more benefits than what their 
contributions could finance. This is an early example of intergenerational inequality in 
Social Security and is attributed to the pay-as-you-go system and, thus, cannot be 
completely avoided. Right now workers spend their entire working lives under the 
system. The program has matured, and it is in the “steady state” when different age 
cohorts are treated equally. But the ever increasing life expectancy and the stipulations in 
Social Security that are unchanged for decades result in a new type of intergenerational 
inequality. If the retirement age stays constant, then younger generations draw more 
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benefits than older generations while all generations contribute over the same working 
lifetime.   
In this essay we propose a fairness principle that imposes equality across age 
cohorts. According to this principle, discrepancy in returns to Social Security cannot by 
produced by differences in life expectancy between cohorts but only by differences in 
real wages. A simple solution to the principle can be achieved by assigning an individual 
normal retirement age to each cohort.  
This essay has two empirical exercises. In the first exercise, we propose a solution 
to the intergenerational equality principle and solve for the normal retirement age for all 
cohorts retiring during 2005-2080. In order to do it, we need to project future fertility and 
mortality rates and the age distribution of the population over the period. Based on the 
retirement schedule for future cohorts and projected future economic and financial 
variables, we forecast the balance of the trust fund. The objective is to impose a rule that 
achieves equality and long term balance in Social Security. In the second part, we solve 
for the retirement age schedule for past cohorts and simulate the trust fund for 1957-
2005. We want to show that if this rule was adopted early, the concerns over the long 
term stability of the program would not arise in 1983.  
 
3.2. Literature survey 
Discussions over Social Security‟s long term financial stability intensified over 
the last decade. Both politicians and academicians examined the causes of financial 
instability of the system and developed policy reforms. Peter Diamond is among the most 
prominent economists who have studied these issues and proposed potential solutions. 
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His book published in 2004, Saving Social Security: A Balanced Approach co-authored 
with Peter Orszag, is the summary of their study of Social Security. It has been widely 
cited and reviewed by other economists. Diamond and Orszag list three main causes of 
Social Security‟s long term deficit: increasing life expectancy, increasing earnings‟ 
inequality, and “the legacy debt.”  
Life expectancy at age 65 has increased significantly since Social Security was 
founded. It has risen by four years for men and five years for women, and the current 
trend is expected to continue in the near future. Diamond and Orszag believe that any 
financial pressure on Social Security from increased life expectancy and healthier seniors 
would not be offset by increased work. First, according to empirical studies, a longer life 
expectancy is not associated with a proportional increase in years of work. Second, Social 
Security is structured in an actuarially fair way; postponed retirement translates into 
higher benefits, and total expected payments are kept the same irrespective of retirement 
age after the full retirement age. Diamond and Orszag indicate that the 1983 reforms 
were designed to restore actuarial balance only for the next 75 years. But life expectancy 
has increased since then, and financing difficulties are again on the horizon. 
The second factor responsible for the Social Security deficit according to 
Diamond and Orszag is the increase in earnings inequality. The maximum taxable base is 
automatically set to increase at the rate of average wage growth; the share of the 
population subject to Social Security tax and eligible for benefits remains roughly 
constant. The share of aggregate earnings not subject to tax has been steadily increasing 
because earnings growth at the top of the income distribution has been more rapid than 
the growth of average earnings. If the earnings distribution was more equal, a larger share 
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of earnings would be subject to tax. Therefore, according to Diamond and Orszag, the 
taxable maximum base must grow not only in line with average wage growth but also 
with aggregate earnings growth.  
The third influence outlined by Diamond and Orszag comes from the past; Social 
Security carries the burden of earlier beneficiaries. Almost all earlier cohorts or 
beneficiaries received more benefits than were financed with their own contributions plus 
interest. They argue that Social Security would be in substantially better shape if past 
generations had received only what they had contributed. Once actuarial balance is 
restored this legacy debt should not be a factor anymore, but Diamond and Orszag are 
concerned about equity issues here and suggest that reforms must distribute this burden 
as evenly as possible across future generations.   
Any solution to the Social Security deficit problem involves increasing receipts 
and/or reducing benefits. In our study we use the cohort-based retirement age as the main 
instrument for meeting financial balance and fairness requirements. The primary concern 
of Diamond and Orszag‟s work is the practical feasibility of their suggestions rather than 
their fundamental fairness. Therefore their approach is to use the most available 
instruments to distribute the actuarial deficit in an even and feasible way across cohorts 
and income groups. They do not change the retirement age because they believe that 
raising the retirement age is equivalent to raising taxes and cutting benefits. They suggest 
that benefits and tax rates should be recalculated regularly as life expectancy grows the 
way benefits and wages subject to tax regularly change with inflation and wage growth. 
This is not equivalent to defining the retirement age for every cohort because the benefit 
and eligibility rules are the same for all. The main difference between their policy and 
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what we suggest in this study is that they are mainly concerned with the long term 
balance of Social Security and how to distribute the burden evenly across generations. 
We are suggesting rules that would equate Social Security services across cohorts first, 
and then we pick a starting point that makes financial stability likely. Diamond and 
Orzsag‟s rules are predetermined and fixed for long periods of time which means that if 
vital and economic rates are different from what is anticipated now then their policy is 
bound to produce inequality across generations again. Our policy adjusts the rules 
according to the prevailing expected rates at every point in time and therefore preserves 
equality in the future.  
Retirement means permanent withdrawal from the labor force. Since the 
beginning of the last century the living standards of retired workers and factors that 
determine the decision to retire, such as loss of productivity, health status, preferences, 
have changed considerably. At the beginning of the twentieth century labor productivity 
was significantly lower at the retirement age than at younger ages. Today productivity 
also declines with age, but there is no evidence that it declines sharply at any particular 
age. Many studies show that productivity deteriorates gradually (Kotlikoff 1988; 
Kotlikoff and Wise 1987). The retirement age of 65 came to the United States from the 
German social insurance program initiated by Bismarck in 1889, but no data show a 
discrete decrease in mental or physical abilities at that age. Before Social Security, some 
state pension programs in the United States used 70 as the retirement age. It was only 
with the introduction of Social Security that the age of 65 became the main retirement 
age. The existence of this retirement age is mostly likely explained by economic 
considerations and custom rather than a sharp decrease in health and productivity. 
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In the early twentieth century it was commonly believed that older men were 
pushed out of the labor force not only by declining health but also by drastic 
technological change (Lynd and Lynd 1929). The common perception was that older 
workers could not operate new machinery, and therefore modern industries were reluctant 
to employ them. When in 1937 Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Cardozo upheld the 
Social Security Act in Helvering vs. Davis, he said that the number of persons aged 65 
and over who are “unable to take care of themselves is growing at a threatening pace. 
More and more of our population is becoming urban and industrial instead of rural and 
agricultural.”1 Similarly, the US Committee on Economic Security in 1935 supported the 
Social Security Act on the basis that a worker‟s “advanced age or invalidity renders him 
incapable of an effective part in productive enterprise.”2 However, Costa (1998) showed 
that labor force participation declined for both rural and urban people since 1880. The 
advances in technology could not explain the common trend for rural and urban 
populations. She argued that retired farmers often left their farms; the statistics showing 
that older people living on a farm were more likely to be employed than other people of 
the same age could not support the technological explanation of growing unemployment 
among the elderly.  
More recent studies conclude that the increase in retirement came about because 
more workers could afford it. Haber and Gratton (1994) studied how the assets of the 
elderly grew over the twentieth century. Using Consumer Expenditure Surveys of 1880-
90 and 1917-19, they showed that summing median savings between ages 25 and 65 
generated assets of $1,745 in 1880-90 and $3,015 in 1917-19 (both in 1917 dollars). They 
                                                 
1
 www.historycentral.com/Documents/Helvering.html 
2
 www.socialsecurity.gov/history/reports/ces/cesbookc7.html, page 137. 
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also studied how much annuity the elderly could buy on reaching 65. They found that by 
using their assets, only 20% of men aged 65 could purchase a ten-year annuity of $231 
per year in 1870, while about 50% of all men aged 65 could buy a ten-year annuity of 
$616 per year by 1920.  
There are other indications that living standards of the elderly improved 
substantially over the last century. The number of retired workers living in households 
headed by their adult children or other relatives declined considerably. In 1880 46% of 
retired men were living with children, but only 22% of retired men lived with children in 
1940 and 5% in 1990. The greater portion of this decline occurred by 1940. The same 
tendency is displayed by the trend in home ownership. In the beginning of the twentieth 
century, a working person was twice as likely to own a home as a retired worker. By 
1990, this discrepancy virtually disappeared meaning that over the century the elderly 
managed to approach the home ownership level of those who are still in the labor force.  
The demand for recreational goods and activities rose considerably over the last 
century. The main factors were the increase in income, the greater number of goods to 
choose from, and lower prices (Costa 1998). Costa found that the income elasticity of 
recreational expenditures (vacations, excursions, meals and alcohol away from home, and 
so forth) is the same for the elderly and the young working group. In fact, she argued that 
the elderly benefited most from this trend of more accessible recreational goods for two 
reasons. First, most modern entertainment activities are less physically demanding. 
Second, the tax rules are such that the pension system makes saving for retirement less 
costly compared to other savings. In addition, retired workers have both the time and 
income to spend on recreation while leisure is more costly for younger workers.  
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Miron and Weil (1997) study the creation of Social Security and discuss the roles 
of political and economic factors in the design of the program. They state that because of 
today‟s lower labor force participation, higher life expectancy, and better health, current 
Social Security undermines its original purpose, which was insurance against old age. 
Miron and Weil note that in 1930 labor force participation for men aged 65 and over was 
58%. In addition to high labor force participation (by today‟s standards), life expectancy 
was much lower in the 1930s. The probability of a 40-year-old man reaching retirement 
at age 65 was only 0.61. High labor force participation combined with high mortality 
meant that few people would actually experience a “retirement.” After World War II, 
labor force participation of elderly men steadily declined from 45% to 21% during 1950-
1990, but there was a slight increase in labor force participation in this age group 
beginning in 2000. Even though labor force participation was lower than in the early 20
th
 
century, the economic status of the elderly improved. The poverty rate among people 65 
and older was 12.2 % in 1993 compared to 15.1 % for the whole population. In 1935 
about half of the elderly population was poor. Prior to Social Security, most retired 
workers were physically unable to work. At present the link between retirement and 
disability is greatly weakened. Miron and Weil point out that, in 1941, 3% of men who 
began receiving Social Security at age 65 said that they retired because they preferred 
leisure to work. By 1982 this figure had risen to 48%. Thus health became less important 
to the labor force decisions of the elderly over the course of the 20
th
 century.   
In 1935 the Social Security program was founded and designed to meet the 
financial risks of old age. Social Security was originally designed as a form of insurance 
against income loss due to age. The designers of the program stressed that it was a form 
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of “social insurance,” and one aim of the program was to reduce uncertainty in income.  
However, in the early years of the program not everyone claimed retirement income from 
Social Security. Over time, however, claims on Social Security became the norm. 
Therefore the role Social Security plays in the economy has changed substantially. For 
the founders of the program retirement was a hazard and unusual at that time: many 
workers never lived to age 65, and many who did kept working. By the end of the century 
healthy retirement became commonplace. What started as an insurance program, which 
supported people in unlikely circumstances as they reached old age, instead became a 
transfer program from which most people would benefit at some point in their lifetime. 
Today, individuals are retiring not because they are unable to work, but because they 
want to enjoy leisure. Retirement is no longer primarily protection against employment 
risk in an industrialized economy; retirement is a time of enjoyment and a reward for 
many years of labor. Among men who began collecting Social Security benefits at 65 in 
1941, only 3% said they retired because they preferred leisure to work, while in 1982 this 
figure was 48%. In the 1960s, people aged 65 or older were twice as likely to be poor 
compared to the rest of population. Today, the elderly are less likely to live below the 
poverty line than people of working age (Hurd 1994). 
Even today after having developed into a much broader welfare program, retired 
workers comprise two-thirds of Social Security beneficiaries and account for more than 
75% of benefit payments. Since the 1930s the demographic structure in the US has seen a 
steady increase in the relative number of elderly people and their life expectancy; these 
trends were driven by advances in living standards and health care. This tendency has 
challenged Social Security‟s long term financial condition. In 1983 the unsoundness of 
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the system was addressed by the National Commission on Social Security Reform, and 
the 75 year actuarial balance was restored. In 1996 the Advisory Council again found the 
program in imbalance over the 75 year period and submitted recommendations to 
eliminate the deficit. In both cases adjustment of the normal retirement age according to 
life expectancy was given secondary significance. Because demographic dynamics are 
the primary reason for the financial shortfall, we believe that the age distribution of the 
population and life expectancy must be crucial determinants of the program‟s parameters, 
which is not the case at present. In 1935, when the Social Security system was 
established, a 20-year old expected that she would spend 12% of her lifetime in 
retirement if she reached retirement age. It turned out this person would spend 22% of her 
lifetime in retirement, and part of this retirement would be spent in recreational activities. 
If these improvements in life expectancy continue, then a 20-year old today will spend a 
third of her lifetime in retirement.  
This literature review indicates that Social Security has grown into a generous 
program, and it will continue to transfer increasing amount of benefits to future 
generations. This is one of the reasons why we propose to impose equality across 
generations by increasing the normal retirement age for every cohort that lives longer, 
while keeping the early retirement option at 62. In our study, we simulate the past and 
future dynamics of the Social Security trust fund in order to test our proposed cohort 
specific retirement age scheme. The approach of many independent authors and Social 
Security Administration experts is to use deterministic demographic and economic 
projections to forecast the Social Security trust fund balance. The methodology behind 
demographic projections assumes that within a certain group the propensity to bear 
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children, die, and migrate stays constant. Statistics confirm that these are reasonable 
assumptions if demographic groups are correctly chosen. These deterministic projections 
forecast a trajectory for each population quantity but carry quite a large degree of 
uncertainty. Lee and Tuljapurkar (1998) offer an alternative approach to improve upon 
the problem of uncertainty in deterministic forecasts. They suggest using stochastic time 
series models to project the probability distribution of any population quantity. The 
balance of the Social Security trust fund is also assumed to be a probability distribution 
which allows one to estimate the probability of solvency.  Lee, Anderson and Tuljapurkar 
(2003) evaluate several plans for achieving long-term solvency by increasing payroll 
taxes, raising the normal retirement age, or investing some portion of the fund in the 
stock market. They estimate that an immediate 2% increase in the payroll tax (from 
12.4% to 14.4%) produces a positive expected fund balance until 2078. An increase in 
the retirement age from 67 to 69 by 2024 keeps the expected fund balance positive until 
2047.  
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3.3. Methodology 
Our methodology sets the expected return – or the ratio of benefits to payroll tax 
payments -- on Social Security across age cohorts. Since Social Security was conceived 
as insurance against the risk of old age, this is equivalent to making the insurance 
premium rate equal for different age cohorts. If we assume that income grows at the same 
rate for all individuals, then the return on Social Security depends only on the age of 
death distribution. We propose to set the normal retirement age for a cohort such that the 
life expectancy at retirement relative to the age of retirement is the same for all cohorts. 
The important note to make here is that the life expectancy in question is measured 
exactly at the retirement of every cohort but not at some fixed date or age such as at birth 
or at age 65. To see the difference, consider the following example. Suppose there are 
only two cohorts with 100 people in each. Let all individuals die at age 75 in the first 
cohort and all die at age 80 in the second cohort. These two cohorts are identical in cohort 
size and differ only by life expectancy or the first moment of the age of death 
distribution. If we fix the retirement age for the first group at 65 years, then the second 
cohort must retire at 69.3 years so that the ratio of years in retirement to working years 
would the same for both cohorts. Now suppose that half of the individuals in the second 
cohort die at age 60 and the other half dies at age 90. In this case, the two cohorts are the 
same except for the second moment of the age of death distribution.  Again, if the 
retirement age is fixed at 65 years for the first cohort, then the second cohort must retire 
at 80 to achieve parity in the ratio of retirement to working years. In other words, life 
expectancy at birth, or any other fixed age, cannot be a determinant of the retirement age.  
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Given the current year‟s normal retirement age, we solve for the retirement age of 
every cohort in future years which equates Social Security service across cohorts. For this 
solution procedure we need to forecast future life tables and develop a numeric search 
algorithm. The methodology for forecasting life tables is described below. The numeric 
search algorithm is fairly elaborate if the retirement age is a continuous variable. Since 
we determine the retirement age in years and months, e.g. 68 years and 2 months of age, 
the algorithm is relatively simple. The algorithm searches for a retirement age for every 
cohort such that the ratio of the number of months in retirement over the number of 
working months (working years expressed in months) is the same as that for the previous 
cohort. Having pinned down the normal retirement age for every future cohort, we 
forecast the size of the Social Security trust fund. The starting normal retirement age, the 
one that is applied in the current year, is set at different levels. Eventually we attempt to 
find the retirement age that maintains the long term solvency of Social Security. 
There are several reasons why we focus on the retirement age in the pursuit of 
Social Security equality. First, grounding the policy on demographic variables seems 
sensible as they are less volatile and more predictable compared to economic variables. 
Moreover, current demographic trends are arguably the main source of fiscal pressure on 
Social Security. Second, the Social Security program departed from its original purpose 
as insurance against the risk of income loss in old age, and a higher normal retirement 
age is needed to move it towards the original goal of the program.  
In order to forecast the dynamics of the Social Security fund under the policy we 
have in mind, we employ stochastic time-series models proposed by Lee and Carter 
(1992) and Lee and Tuljapurkar (1994) to project the age distributions of the population 
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and economic variables. These models are an improvement over the standard method of 
using high, medium and low scenarios. The latter approach assumes correlations among 
fertility, mortality and other vital rates. There is no a satisfactory explanation for why 
certain correlations should remain for a long period of time. Second, the high-medium-
low approach does not assess the degree of uncertainty in the forecasts. In this regard, 
stochastic forecasts of population and economic variables (Lee-Carter and Lee-
Tuljapurkar) have some advantages. Because stochastic models treat most variables as 
stochastic processes, this approach imposes weaker assumptions about the future 
dynamics of variables and also provides a credible confidence interval for every forecast. 
But long forecast horizons far exceed the intended use of these models. As the horizon 
expands, probability distributions widen and devalue forecasts in these stochastic models. 
Nonetheless, the relative simplicity of the approach makes it an appropriate research tool 
for our study. 
The dynamics of the Social Security trust fund are generated by the following 
variables:  
 t - time in years; 
 B(t) - balance of the Trust Fund in year t; 
 r(t) - real interest rate in year t; 
T(s,a,t)- matrix of per-capita taxes paid in year t in Social Security by 
   sex, age; 
 D(s,a,t)- matrix of disability benefits paid in year t in Social Security  
   by sex, age; 
 S(s, t) - retirement benefits per capita received in year t from Social  
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   Security by sex; 
 O(s, t) - number of retired workers by sex; 
 a - administrative cost of the system as a fixed fraction of  
   benefits paid; 
 p(t) - rate of growth of real wages in year t; 
 I(t) - real interest earned in year t; 
 T(t) - total taxes collected by the system in year t; 
 H(t) - total benefits paid in year t; 
 N(a,s,t)- matrix of the number of individuals in year t by sex, age; 
 K(t) - aggregate rate of taxation of retirement and disability 
   benefits. 
The dynamics of the system are presented by the following equation: 
)()()()(),,(),,()()()1( tHtKtHatHtsaNtsaTtItBtB  (5) 
Total benefits, H(t) = D(a,s,t)∙N(a,s,t) + S(s,t)∙R(s,t), are the sum of two products: 
total disability benefits and total retirement benefits. T(a,s,t)∙N(a,s,t) is the product of tax 
payments and the population distribution by age and sex. It is equal to the total payment 
into Social Security per year. I(t) is interest earned and is equal to r(t)∙B(t).  
We need to update the following variables for every year beyond the base year of 
2005:  
- N(a,s,t) (population by age, sex)  
- T(s,a,t) (age-sex specific average tax payment schedule) 
- D(s,a,t) (age-sex specific average disability benefit schedule) 
- S(s,t) (sex specific average retirement benefit) 
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- O(s,t) (sex specific number of retired workers) 
- r(t) (real interest rate)  
- p(t) (wage growth rate)  
 
We update the tax schedules T(s,a,t) and benefits schedule D(s,a,t) by the projected real 
wage growth for every year. The average retirement payment S(s,t) is updated based on 
the wage growth rate in the year when the retiring cohort was 60 years old because 
benefits are not indexed after the age of 60. The number of retired workers O(s,t) depends 
on the current normal retirement age and the population age and sex distribution. We 
assume that everybody retires at the normal retirement age. Although this assumption 
simplifies the setup, we do not think it is as a strong assumption as it appears because 
Social Security benefits are adjusted for early retirement so that actuarially it is the same 
as normal retirement.  
Economic forecasts are generated with AR(1) with constrained long run means. 
Standard AR does not fit long term forecasts. Long term forecasts in these models may 
lead to implausible levels of the economic variables. Instead we use AR with a long term 
mean value. In our model rt is the real annual effective interest rate at time t; if g is the 
long run average interest (set at 3%), then:  
ttt grgr )( 1  (6) 
Wage or productivity growth rate is modeled similarly. It is also constrained to the 
long term mean, h, which we set at 1.1%.  The wage model is:  
 ttt hwhw )( 1  (7) 
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The dynamics of population by the age-sex matrix, N(a,s,t), are generated by 
recursion: tttt InXn 1  
where X is a Leslie population projection matrix, n is a vector containing population 
numbers by age, and I is net immigration. Entries into the population matrix come from 
the projected fertility, mortality and net migration rates. In this analysis, we bring fertility 
and mortality rates in as stochastic variables while net migration is fixed at the future 
levels assumed by the Social Security Administration. Mortality for both sexes and 
fertility are fitted by similar models. The model of mortality is specified as:  
  
txxtx bkatxm ,),(ln  (8) 
where ax and bx are age-specific constants and kt is a time specific index of the general 
level of mortality. Both constants ax and bx and past values of the mortality index kt are 
estimated. This model is underdetermined because there are no given regressors on the 
right hand side. On the right side of the equation we have only parameters to be estimated 
and the unknown index kt. In order to overcome the issue of identification, we need to 
normalize the parameters. Suppose vectors a, b and k are a solution. For any scalar c, it 
must be true that a – bc, b, k + c are also a solution. Similarly a, bc, k/c are again a 
solution. Therefore, k is closed under the linear transformation, b is closed under 
multiplication, and a is closed under addition. Therefore we normalize bx to sum to one 
and kt to sum to zero, which implies that ax are simply the averages over time and ax are 
the averages of ln(mx,t) over time. Even normalized parameters cannot be estimated using 
OLS; instead we use the singular value decomposition (SVD) method to find a least 
squares solution. This technique is available in STATA. Projected mortality and fertility 
rates provide a Leslie matrix which is a matrix of survival rates for different age groups 
52 
 
that can be used recursively to project population growth given the current age 
distribution. That is what we do to forecast population starting with year 2005‟s 
population.  
All the models above are estimated based on historical values over the past 50 
year series. Fortunately, data availability has not been a significant issue so far. Benefits 
and Social Security trust fund data are reported in the Social Security Administration‟s 
Annual Statistical Supplement. Productivity rates, age distribution of the population, and 
taxable income (from which Social Security taxes are derived) are provided by the 
Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
 
3.4. Results 
The estimates of the Lee-Carter mortality and fertility models give us the 
projection of age and sex distributions of the population until 2080. Economic models 
provide us with indexes for upgrading tax and benefit payments each year. The results of 
the estimation of these models are given in Tables 3.1-3.4. 
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Table 3.1 
Single Value Decomposition Estimates of the Fertility Model 
 
Age cx dx 
15 0.0084 0.0031 
16 0.0174 0.0045 
17 0.043 0.0004 
18 0.064 0.0079 
19 0.087 0.031 
20 0.1059 0.049 
21 0.1123 0.0609 
22 0.114 0.0734 
23 0.1142 0.0809 
24 0.1144 0.0822 
25 0.1147 0.0781 
26 0.1153 0.069 
27 0.1156 0.0577 
28 0.1145 0.0494 
29 0.1118 0.041 
30 0.1061 0.0367 
31 0.101 0.028 
32 0.0917 0.0252 
33 0.0812 0.0232 
34 0.0701 0.0259 
35 0.0599 0.0262 
36 0.0515 0.026 
37 0.0411 0.0264 
38 0.0316 0.0269 
39 0.0252 0.0257 
40 0.019 0.0239 
41 0.014 0.023 
42 0.009 0.0151 
43 0.0057 0.0117 
44 0.0032 0.009 
45 0.0018 0.0064 
46 0.0007 0.0045 
47 0.0001 0.0028 
48 0 0.0015 
49 0 0.0008 
50 0 0.0004 
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Table 3.2 
Single Value Decomposition Estimates of the Mortality Equation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year Kx Year Kx  Age ax bx Age ax bx Age ax bx 
2000 -15.06 2041 -30.03  0 -3.64 0.09 40 -5.70 0.03 80 -2.34 0.04 
2001 -15.43 2042 -30.40  1 -5.19 0.19 41 -5.62 0.04 81 -2.26 0.04 
2002 -15.79 2043 -30.76  2 -6.18 0.13 42 -5.53 0.04 82 -2.17 0.04 
2003 -16.16 2044 -31.13  3 -6.88 0.09 43 -5.43 0.04 83 -2.09 0.04 
2004 -16.52 2045 -31.49  4 -7.35 0.06 44 -5.34 0.04 84 -2.00 0.04 
2005 -16.89 2046 -31.86  5 -7.64 0.05 45 -5.25 0.04 85 -1.92 0.04 
2006 -17.25 2047 -32.22  6 -7.80 0.05 46 -5.15 0.05 86 -1.85 0.04 
2007 -17.62 2048 -32.59  7 -7.84 0.05 47 -5.06 0.05 87 -1.78 0.04 
2008 -17.98 2049 -32.95  8 -7.82 0.06 48 -4.97 0.05 88 -1.71 0.04 
2009 -18.35 2050 -33.32  9 -7.73 0.08 49 -4.88 0.05 89 -1.64 0.04 
2010 -18.71 2051 -33.68  10 -7.62 0.10 50 -4.79 0.05 90 -1.57 0.04 
2011 -19.08 2052 -34.05  11 -7.49 0.11 51 -4.71 0.05 91 -1.51 0.04 
2012 -19.44 2053 -34.41  12 -7.35 0.10 52 -4.62 0.05 92 -1.44 0.04 
2013 -19.81 2054 -34.78  13 -7.21 0.08 53 -4.54 0.04 93 -1.37 0.04 
2014 -20.18 2055 -35.14  14 -7.07 0.05 54 -4.46 0.04 94 -1.31 0.04 
2015 -20.54 2056 -35.51  15 -6.95 0.04 55 -4.39 0.04 95 -1.24 0.04 
2016 -20.91 2057 -35.87  16 -6.84 0.03 56 -4.31 0.04 96 -1.16 0.04 
2017 -21.27 2058 -36.24  17 -6.75 0.02 57 -4.24 0.04 97 -1.08 0.04 
2018 -21.64 2059 -36.61  18 -6.67 0.02 58 -4.17 0.04 98 -1.00 0.04 
2019 -22.00 2060 -36.97  19 -6.61 0.02 59 -4.09 0.04 99 -0.90 0.04 
2020 -22.37 2061 -37.34  20 -6.56 0.03 60 -4.02 0.03 100 -0.81 0.04 
2021 -22.73 2062 -37.70  21 -6.51 0.03 61 -3.95 0.03 101 -0.72 0.04 
2022 -23.10 2063 -38.07  22 -6.48 0.03 62 -3.88 0.03 102 -0.64 0.04 
2023 -23.46 2064 -38.43  23 -6.46 0.03 63 -3.81 0.03 103 -0.54 0.04 
2024 -23.83 2065 -38.80  24 -6.44 0.03 64 -3.73 0.03 104 -0.46 0.04 
2025 -24.19 2066 -39.16  25 -6.42 0.03 65 -3.66 0.03 105 -0.40 0.04 
2026 -24.56 2067 -39.53  26 -6.40 0.03 66 -3.58 0.03 106 -0.37 0.04 
2027 -24.92 2068 -39.89  27 -6.39 0.03 67 -3.50 0.03 107 -0.35 0.04 
2028 -25.29 2069 -40.26  28 -6.37 0.03 68 -3.42 0.03 108 -0.31 0.04 
2029 -25.65 2070 -40.62  29 -6.34 0.02 69 -3.34 0.03 109 -0.26 0.04 
2030 -26.02 2071 -40.99  30 -6.31 0.02 70 -3.26 0.03    
2031 -26.38 2072 -41.35  31 -6.28 0.02 71 -3.17 0.03    
2032 -26.75 2073 -41.72  32 -6.24 0.02 72 -3.08 0.03    
2033 -27.11 2074 -42.08  33 -6.19 0.02 73 -2.99 0.03    
2034 -27.48 2075 -42.45  34 -6.14 0.02 74 -2.90 0.03    
2035 -27.84 2076 -42.81  35 -6.08 0.02 75 -2.80 0.03    
2036 -28.21 2077 -43.18  36 -6.02 0.02 76 -2.71 0.03    
2037 -28.57 2078 -43.54  37 -5.95 0.02 77 -2.62 0.04    
2038 -28.94 2079 -43.91  38 -5.87 0.03 78 -2.53 0.04    
2039 -29.30 2080 -44.27  39 -5.79 0.03 79 -2.43 0.04    
2040 -29.67   
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Table 3.3 
Population Forecast 
 
Year Population Year Population 
2005 296576820 2043 415368601 
2006 299381851 2044 418780149 
2007 302204639 2045 422211522 
2008 305046273 2046 425665560 
2009 307906080 2047 429145145 
2010 310785252 2048 432650477 
2011 313683246 2049 436186481 
2012 316601522 2050 439753795 
2013 319539519 2051 443357199 
2014 322498370 2052 446996298 
2015 325478083 2053 450673401 
2016 328477226 2054 454396197 
2017 331496777 2055 458166274 
2018 334535509 2056 461985208 
2019 337594016 2057 465841151 
2020 340670509 2058 469756664 
2021 343765555 2059 473730507 
2022 346877857 2060 477762039 
2023 350007761 2061 481854398 
2024 353153583 2062 486008333 
2025 356315279 2063 490223207 
2026 359491101 2064 494501668 
2027 362681606 2065 498842355 
2028 365885101 2066 503253649 
2029 369102030 2067 507729590 
2030 372330622 2068 512276296 
2031 375571246 2069 516894573 
2032 378821884 2070 521579982 
2033 382083970 2071 526340714 
2034 385356237 2072 531176742 
2035 388640065 2073 536085059 
2036 391935077 2074 541065957 
2037 395242369 2075 546121461 
2038 398561480 2076 551262380 
2039 401894236 2077 556479727 
2040 405239131 2078 561770489 
2041 408599590 2079 567129811 
2042 411975231 2080 572551841 
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Table 3.4 
Normal Retirement Age 2005 - 2080 (Starting NRA = 66) 
 
  NRA   NRA 
Year DOB Years months Year DOB Years Months 
2005 1939 66 0 2044 1974 70 7 
2006 1940 66 1 2045 1975 70 8 
2007 1941 66 3 2046 1976 70 9 
2008 1942 66 4 2047 1977 70 11 
2009 1943 66 5 2048 1978 71 0 
2010 1944 66 7 2049 1978 71 0 
2011 1945 66 8 2050 1979 71 3 
2012 1946 66 10 2051 1980 71 5 
2013 1947 66 11 2052 1981 71 6 
2014 1948 67 0 2053 1982 71 7 
2015 1948 67 0 2054 1983 71 9 
2016 1949 67 3 2055 1984 71 10 
2017 1950 67 4 2056 1985 72 0 
2018 1951 67 6 2057 1985 72 0 
2019 1952 67 7 2058 1986 72 3 
2020 1953 67 9 2059 1987 72 4 
2021 1954 67 10 2060 1988 72 5 
2022 1955 67 11 2061 1989 72 7 
2023 1956 68 1 2062 1990 72 8 
2024 1956 68 1 2063 1991 72 10 
2025 1957 68 4 2064 1992 72 11 
2026 1958 68 5 2065 1993 73 0 
2027 1959 68 6 2066 1993 73 0 
2028 1960 68 8 2067 1994 73 3 
2029 1961 68 9 2068 1995 73 4 
2030 1962 68 11 2069 1996 73 6 
2031 1963 69 0 2070 1997 73 7 
2032 1963 69 0 2071 1998 73 9 
2033 1964 69 3 2072 1999 73 10 
2034 1965 69 4 2073 2000 73 11 
2035 1966 69 6 2074 2001 74 1 
2036 1967 69 7 2075 2001 74 1 
2037 1968 69 9 2076 2002 74 3 
2038 1969 69 10 2077 2003 74 5 
2039 1970 69 11 2078 2004 74 6 
2040 1971 70 1 2079 2005 74 7 
2041 1971 70 1 2080 2006 74 9 
2042 1972 70 4     
2043 1973 70 5     
        
Notes: DOB = date of birth   NRA = normal retirement age 
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We solved for all future normal retirement ages based on a starting normal 
retirement age of 65, 66, or 67 years. The results for the normal retirement age projection 
are presented in Table 3.4. Given the future normal retirement age for every year, the 
indicators of economic performance, and population age and sex distributions, we 
projected the dynamics of the Social Security trust fund for these three starting normal 
retirement ages (Figure 3.1). Our projection shows that if the retirement age of 66 is set 
today and the proposed retirement scheme is followed, Social Security is expected to be 
solvent over the 75 year horizon. The retirement age in 2080 under this scheme is 
expected to be 74 years and 4 months with life expectancy at that age to be over 20 years. 
In 2005 the retirement age was 66 years and the life expectancy at the retirement was 18 
years. This is the main result we were looking for. The normal retirement age of 66 years 
is projected to keep the long term balance of Social Security sound if the retirement 
scheme which imposes the intergenerational fairness principle is adopted.  
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Figure 3.1: Projection of Social Security Trust Fund under Intergeneration 
Equality for 2005-2080 
 
The last exercise we conducted for this study was to construct the 95 confidence interval 
for our projected Social Security trust fund dynamics (Figure 3.2). Our economic 
variables are modeled as stochastic variables, so we generated 500 different trajectories 
for interest rate and wage growth rate simulating the error terms. That in turn gave 500 
alternative dynamics of the Social Security trust fund or, in other words, the distribution 
of the future value of the fund. With 66 years as the starting normal retirement age, Social 
Security has a 58% chance of solvency by 2080.   
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Figure 3.2: 95% Confidence Interval for Social Security Trust Fund (Starting NRA = 66) 
 
We simulate the dynamics of the Social Security trust fund using the demographic 
data and the program‟s provisions since 1935 (Figure 3.3). Effectively we project the 
fund‟s past balance using historical data. We assume that the retirement age does not 
affect other payments from the fund such as disability and payments to dependents.  
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 Figure 3.3: Simulation of Social Security Trust Fund under Intergeneration 
Equality for 1957-2005 
 
We conduct this type of exercise because merely restoring 75 year actuarial 
balance will not provide long term financial soundness of the Social Security program. 
Preserving the current structure of Social Security‟s benefits and revenue rules would 
result in fiscal imbalance as time passes and the projection period shifts into the future. 
This is because it is highly likely that trends in mortality and fertility will continue 
beyond the projection period. If, in fact, life expectancy of retirees continues to rise 
and/or fertility continues to decline in the distant future, then the cost of Social Security 
will always grow at a higher rate than its revenue. Therefore, the reform of Social 
Security should change the rules so that the growth rate of costs and the growth rate of 
income remain similar over time and fiscal imbalance does not reoccur. Establishing a 
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mechanism to automatically adjust the rules of Social Security in accordance with 
demographic trends would address this issue. Under the automatic adjustment approach 
changes should be made to the payroll tax rate, Social Security benefits, the normal 
retirement age or some combination of these three on an annual or periodic basis to keep 
the system in actuarial balance. There are already automated adjustments in place that 
index benefits to changes in prices. We suggest indexation that takes into account future 
demographic changes in order to automatically remove strain on the fiscal status of the 
program.  
Automatic adjustment mechanisms aimed at preserving long term financial 
soundness of the pension fund have already been adopted by a number of industrialized 
countries, including Sweden, France and Canada. In Sweden, social security benefits are 
annually indexed not only by the CPI but also by the balance ratio. The balance ratio is 
the ratio of the present value of contributions over the present value of liabilities. No 
matter what kind of risk may affect the fiscal status of the pension fund, if expected 
liabilities are greater than expected contributions, then the growth rate of pension benefits 
slows down by the balance ratio. If, on the contrary, future contributions exceed future 
liabilities, then benefits grow faster until the balance between assets and liabilities is 
reached.  
The second part of our empirical exercise has two stages. First, we solve for 
normal retirement ages from 1957 to 2005. The numerical search algorithm finds a 
retirement age for every cohort over this period such that the ratio of the expected time in 
retirement to the number of working years at the time a worker retires is constant for 
every cohort. It satisfies our fairness principle that differences in benefits drawn should 
62 
 
be based only on wages and not other characteristics of cohorts. Second, we simulate the 
size of the Social Security trust fund assuming our scheme is imposed in 1957. The 
methodology is simple. The total amount of benefits is the sum of old age and disability 
benefits. Disability benefits remain the same. But old age benefits are recalculated based 
on the new retirement age, the population‟s age distribution and the average benefit per 
retired worker. Assuming that the birthdays of different income level earners are 
uniformly distributed over a year, we multiply the average benefit by the estimated 
number of retired workers under the new retirement age. Similarly, additional tax 
payments to Social Security by people older than 65 and below the retirement age are 
estimated. The number of people in this category is calculated based on the age 
distribution, the retirement age and the assumption that birthdays are uniformly 
distributed and multiplied by the prevailing payroll tax rate and average wage in this age 
category. 
There have been numerous amendments to Social Security since its conception in 
1935. Therefore the exercise that we are suggesting may bring a question of whether it is 
a reasonable assumption that this policy of adjusted retirement age can be combined with 
all others because we are assuming that all figures remain at historical levels. We think it 
is a legitimate assumption. First of all, most amendments until 1980 were envisioned or at 
least anticipated by the Social Security planners. Most tax increase and employee 
coverage changes that did occur until 1983 were specified in the 1935 and 1939 acts. 
Second, even those changes that were not originally planned, for example the rise in 
taxable ceilings from 1966 to 1976, did not occur because of concerns of long term 
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financial stability but  rather were the result of the unplanned expansion of the program. 
Therefore we can use the historical data as it is without making any adjustments.  
The projected retirement age schedule is given in Table 3.5. Starting with age 65 
in 1957, the normal retirement age would become 68 years and 6 months in 2005. The 
result of such a policy is that the balance in the Social Security trust fund is projected to 
be $3,235 billion in 2005 instead of the actual balance of $1,857 billion. The difference is 
$1,377 billion which is higher than the present value of the future deficit of the program 
under current trends and regulations. In the previous chapter we found that setting the 
normal retirement at 66 in 2005 and then adjusting it accordingly would keep Social 
Security solvent in the long term. This means that adopting this policy in 1957 would 
keep the Social Security in positive balance over the 75-year projection period. 
In 1983, the Greenspan Commission on Social Security Reform recommended 
amendments that would provide additional funds in the amount of $168 billion over the 
years 1983-1989 to cover the short term imbalance. Our estimates show that the trust 
fund would have $357 billion more in 1983 under our adjusted retirement age policy; 
therefore these measures would not have been necessary if our policy had been adopted. 
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Table 3.5 
Normal Retirement Age 1957-2005 Under Intergenerational Equality 
  
  NRA   NRA 
Year DOB Years Months Year DOB Years Months 
1957 1892 65 0 1982 1915 66 9 
1958 1893 65 1 1983 1916 66 10 
1959 1894 65 2 1984 1917 66 11 
1960 1895 65 3 1985 1918 67 0 
1961 1896 65 4 1986 1919 67 1 
1962 1896 65 4 1987 1920 67 2 
1963 1897 65 5 1988 1921 67 2 
1964 1898 65 6 1989 1922 67 3 
1965 1899 65 7 1990 1923 67 4 
1966 1900 65 8 1991 1924 67 5 
1967 1901 65 8 1992 1925 67 6 
1968 1901 65 9 1993 1926 67 7 
1969 1902 65 10 1994 1927 67 8 
1970 1903 65 11 1995 1928 67 9 
1971 1904 66 0 1996 1929 67 10 
1972 1905 66 1 1997 1930 67 11 
1973 1906 66 2 1998 1931 68 11 
1974 1907 66 2 1999 1932 68 0 
1975 1908 66 3 2000 1933 68 1 
1976 1909 66 4 2001 1934 68 2 
1977 1910 66 5 2002 1935 68 3 
1978 1911 66 6 2003 1936 68 4 
1979 1912 66 7 2004 1937 68 5 
1980 1913 66 7 2005 1938 68 6 
1981 1914 66 8     
        
Notes:
 
DOB = date of birth   NRA = normal retirement age 
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3.5. Conclusion. 
 In this essay we proposed a fairness principle for Social Security‟s treatment of 
workers over time and a simple solution that would achieve this intergenerational 
equality. There were several reasons we chose the retirement age as the means of 
imposing the fairness principle. First, trends in demographic variables are more stable 
than those in economic variables, and therefore their forecasts are more accurate. Second, 
the living standards of the elderly, their health status, and life expectancy have improved 
considerably since 1935 when Social Security was conceived. This means that at present 
Social Security does not function as old-age insurance for a large share of the retired 
population, but rather as transfer of money once they reach retirement. Therefore a higher 
normal retirement age for each cohort living longer with an option of early retirement at 
62 for everybody is consistent with the purpose of old-age insurance. Finally, the 
demographic trends are the primary cause of the long term imbalance in Social Security. 
 Based on our solution to the requirement that only differences in wages can cause 
inequality across generations, we solved for the retirement age for all age cohorts in 
periods 1957-2005 and 2005-2080. That allowed us to simulate the dynamics of the trust 
fund for those periods under our policy. We find that if the intergenerational equality was 
imposed in 1957 at the level of returns in that year, the concerns over financial stability 
of Social Security would not arise. Both in 1983 and 2005 the present value of the future 
deficit of the program would be less than the additional means accumulated due to the 
imposed equality. We also find that setting the normal retirement age at 66 in 2005 and 
adjusting it for all future cohorts keeps Social Security in balance over the 75 year 
horizon.  
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We do not elaborate on political feasibility of our policy; this is probably the main 
difference between our results and those of other studies on Social Security reform, and it 
is the main weakness of our study.  At the same time, because we are not concerned with 
feasibility, we can base our approach on fairness attributes of Social Security.  
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Appendix 
 
 
Real Interest Rate and Average Wage Growth ARIMA models‟ estimates 
 
 
 
 
  R
2
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         (0.364)          (4.28 ) 
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 = 0.47 
        (0.262)         (1.56) 
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